History, Authenticity, and Politics: Tariq al-Bishri's Interpretation of Modern Egyptian History by Meijer, R.
HISTORY. IMTHEjrriCITÏ, UND POLITICS:
TflRIQ AL-BISHRI'S INTERPRETATION
OF MODERN EGYPTIBM HISTORY
Roei Meijer
Occasional Paper nr. 4 September 1989
Roei Meijer Is Research Assistent at the Institute for Near
Eastern and Islamic Studies of the University of Amsterdam,
and affiliated to Middle East Research Associates (MERA),
Amsterdam.
CIP-GEGEVENS KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG
Meijer, Roei
History, authenticity and politics : Tariq al-Bishri's
interpretation of modern Egyptian history / Roei Meijer.
Amsterdam : Middle East Research Associates. -




SISO 901 UDC 930(620)
Trefw. : geschiedschrijving ; Egypte.
Introduction
Since the rise of Egyptian nationalism at the beginning of
this century, historiography has been closely tied to polit-
ical goals.1 Every political current had its own inter-
pretation of history, and in many ways the ideological
struggle between these currents can be understood as a
battle between different interpretations of history. This
applies as much to the struggle between the Wafd, the com-
munist movement, and the Moslem Brotherhood in the 1930s
and 1940s, as to the efforts of Nasserist regime to eradi-
cate its enemies from historical memory in the 1950s and
1960s.
With the establishment of a multi-party system ten
years ago and the reemergence of Egypt ' s main political
currents, the urge to legitimize oneself in historical terras
has become even stronger. Having failed to fulfil the aspi-
rations of the Revolution of 23 July 1952 the present
regime has gradually relinquished its monopoly over the
national historical image. In the ensuing struggle for
Egypt's historical past the different political parties have
tried to fill the vacuum.2
Undoubtedly Tariq al-Bishri is within this context
one of the most interesting contemporary Egyptian histor-
ians.3 Al-Bishri's interpretation of Egyptian history merits
a closer look for several reasons. Firstly, al-Bishri is one
of the few Egyptian intellectuals who has presented a coher-
1 According to Crabbs, the leader of the Nationalist
Party, Mustafa Kamll (1874-1908) should be considered the
first ideological Egyptian historian: Jack A. Crabbs Jr.,
"The Writing of History in Nineteenth-Century Egypt", The
American University in Cairo Press, 19B4, pp. 159-160.
2 Gudrun Krämer, The use of History in Contemporary
Egyptian Party Politics. Paper presented to the Conference
"Commitment and Objectivity in Contemporary Egyptian
Historiography, 1919-1952" organized by the Dutch Institute
of Archeology and Arabic Studies from August 31 to September
3, 1987.
3 Teriq al-Bishri was born in 1931. His grandfather was
Shaykh al-Azhar from 1900-1918. Tariq al-Bishri is not by
profession a historian; he studied law, and has climbed the
hierarchy as a judge to become mustash3r, member of the
Egyptian Conseil d'État in the 1980s.
ent and sophisticated view of modern Egyptian history from
the early nineteenth century to the present day. Secondly,
his view has evolved over a long period of time, spanning
two and half decades, rendering his work an important source
for the study of Ideological changes during that period.
Thirdly, al-BIshri's work can be considered as an attempt to
build a new political consensus based on a common concept of
the past.
What makes al-Bishri's work particularly interesting
is his gradual reinterpration of Egyptian history from a
predominant secular nationalist perspective couched in a
Marxist terminology written in the 1960s and 1970s, to a
predominant Islamic perspective acquired in the 1980s, based
on a terminology derived from the discourse on the turath
(the Islamic heritage).
Despite al-Bishri's «interpretation of history, it
Is my main contention that the basic themes in al-Bishri's
work have remained the same. The themes unity, democracy,
and independence run through all his work from the 1960s to
the present.1 Their content, however, has changed in accor-
dance with al-Bishri's shift in perspective, which is re-
lated to broader national political developments, as the
rise of the Islamic movement in the 1970s.
In al-Bishri's theory of history the three basic
themes, unity, democracy, and independence, are both an
abstraction, as well as a historical reality. In its ab-
stract form these themes present an ideal, embodied by the
masses, while In their concrete historical form the themes
3 The most succint presentation of al-Bishri's views on
the subject can be found In: Tariq al-Bishri al-Dîmuqratiyya
fl 'Itar al-haraka al-wataniyya. published in the
collection of TSriij al-Bishrl's studies on democracy
"Dirâsât ft al-dlmuqratiyya al-misriyya", Cairo, 1987, pp.
143-149. The article was originally published in al-Ahram
15/5/1976. This collection of articles consists mostly of
articles published In the 1970s and written from his earlier
secular point of view on subjects as the Constitution of
1923, the struggle between the Wafd and the monarchy, etc.
The fact that they have been reprinted with the addition of
a few new articles in which al-Blshrî expounds his new
ideas, indicates that he has not repudiated his previous
ideas completely.
are represented in an imperfect manner by the struggle of
the democratic nationalist movement to fulfil .the ideal.
Once they merge in the right mix in a certain period the
ideal of the democratic nationalist movement will have been
fulfilled and history will come to an end. As Egypt is
neither unified, democratic, nor independent, it is obvious
history has gone awry. It is the task of the historian to
determine how this came about.
Al-Bishri's historical analysis can therefore be read
as an attempt to determine which political forces have
contributed to fulfilling the ideal of the democratic na-
tionalist movement. In his earlier period (which is dealt
with in Part I ) the criteria he uses to measure their con-
tribution are Marxist, nationalist and secularist. History
is seen as a pendulum swing between imperialism, the react-
ionary right, and absolutism on the one side, against the
democratic nationalist movement on the other side, whose
attempts to unite the three themes constantly eludes it.
In his later period (dealt with in Part II) al-Bishri
believes that the main weak point in left-wing secular
historiography is the elimination of the cultural, primarily
Islamic component as contained in the turath. In his attempt
to reinterprete Egyptian history along these new lines he
believes that one of the reasons why history has not ful-
filled its promises should be ascribed to the deviation of
the Moslem community from the Islamic path. Secular politi-
cal currents during the past century have concentrated too
much on achieving political and economic independence with-
out paying due attention to cultural independence. True
indpendence can only be based on an Islamic identity and
allegiance. This cultural struggle is portrayed as the
struggle between al-wafid (that which comes from outside and
Is alienating) and al-mawruth (that which is inherited).
PART I
THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
The Rise of the Liberal Nationalist Movement
Tariq al-Bishri'a believed in the second half of the 1960s
and the beginning of the 1970s that Egyptian history was
dominated by the nationalist struggle against foreign occup-
ation and the democratic struggle against internal despotism
(istibdâd). For Tariq al-Bishri these two tendencies con-
stitute an indivisible unity: Independence without democracy
is inconceivable, for the ruling elite will always try to
compromise with foreign powers if the masses are unable to
exert their political rights. He traces this development
through modern Egyptian history, analyzing the successive
phases and circumstances in which these two tendencies meet
and separate as the basic pulse of history.4
The first instance of these two tendencies meeting
occured during the Urabl Revolution (1881) when it was
expressed in the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians". Egyptian
military officers and notablea associated the growing
foreign intervention in Egypt with the despotism of the
khédives Isma'il and Tawfiq. The British Occupation, how-
ever, terminated the first Egyptian demands for a parliament
and independence.5
During the next stage of the democratic nationalist
movement, at the beginning of this century, it was split
into its two component tendencies. The Nationalist Party
(al-Hlzb al-Matant) gave priority to the nationalist
struggle against the British, leaning on the Ottoman sultan
4 The most succinct presentation of al-Bishri's views
on the subject can be found in: Tariq al-Bishri, al-
Dlmuqratiyya fl 'itar al-haraka al-wataniyya [Democracy in
the Framework of the Nationalist Movement], in: "Dirâsât fî
al-dlmuqrâtiyya al-misriyya", pp. 143-149. The article was
originally published in al-Ahram 15/5/1976.
5 Tflriq al-Bishrl, Sa'd ZaqhlOl... wa fikruhu al-
slyasl, al-Tall'a, 4 (1969) 3, p. 40; Tariq al-Bishrl, "Sa'd
Zaghlul yufâwidu al-'istimar", Cairo, 1977, p. 14; Tariq al-
Bishri, "al-DIrauqratiyya wa nlzSm 23 yûlyû", Cairo, 1987,
pp. 44-46.
and khédive Abbas II, while the Unrnia Party depended on the
British in its democratic struggle against the despotism of
the khédive and the implementation of gradual reforms. The
split is ascribed by al-Bishri to the class character of the
two parties, with the Umma Party representing the large
landowners who were tied economically to the British, and
the Nationalist Party finding its supporters among the
Egyptian middle classes who were threatened by British
political and economic interests.6
The two tendencies of the nationalist democratic
struggle merged again during the Revolution of 1919, the
great national uprising led by the Mafd. Al-Bishri differs
from most Egyptian left-wing historians in his positive
evaluation of the 1919 Revolution. He believes that the 1919
Revolution marked an important step forward in achieving the
goals of the nationalist democratic movement.
The most important accomplishment of the Wafd is that
it established a national unity between Copts and Moslems,
expressed in the slogan "nationalism is our religion and
independence is our life" (al-wataniyya dtnuna wa al-
istiqiai hayatunfl)> This was a major setback for imperialism
in its endeavor to divide Egypt into sects (tawa'if).'
The other important achievement of the revolution was
the step it made to independence. Due to the tenacity of the
Hafd and its leader Sa'd Zaghlul the British were forced to
renounce the Protectorate and formally recognized Egypt's
independence in the Unilateral Declaration of February 28
1922.'
However, by far the most important achievement of the
1919 Revolution was the promulgation of the Constitution of
1923. The installment of a parliament, the implementation of
universal suffrage, the establishment of ministerial respon-
'. Tariq al-Bishrl, al-Dtmuqratiyya f I 'itar al-Haraka
al-wataniyya, pp. 144-145.
7 Tariq al-Bishrî, "al-MuslimÛn wa al-'aqbat", pp. 1O1-
126 and pp. 135-139.
• Tariq al-Bishrî, "Sa'd ZagJilOl yufawidu al-
'isflmar", pp. 182-183.
sibility, as well as the recognition of civil rights are
highly praised. In addition, al-Bishri considers the freedom
of organization, press and religion, ' as well as the separ-
ation of powers between the legislative, the executive, and
the Judiciary, as the basic elements of democracy.10
Tariq al-Bishri concludes that the responslblity for
the failure of the liberal period cannot be attributed to
the 1923 Constitution itself, but must be ascribed to fraud-
ulant elections, corruption and other unconstitutional means
of obtaining power.11 This was made possible by the alli-
ance between the king and the minority parties,12 supported
by the British who retained their extensive powers to inter-
fere in internal Egyptian affairs.
The Wafd's huge potential as a mass movement to
defeat these forces was severely reduced, al-Bishri
believes, as a result of its own internal contradictions. On
the one hand it rallied the masses behind its nationalist
and democratic demands, on the other it was constrained by
its political strategy of "peaceful legal methods" ( al-
turuq al-silmiyya al-mashrp'a) which tied it to the Con-
stitution and committed it to the renouncement of force
after the initial outbreak of the revolution in March 1919.
Tariq al-Bishri partly ascribes this contradiction to the
WaftJ's petite bourgeois character. Incapable of overcoming
its contradiction the Wafd never succeeded in defeating the
reactionary forces, evicting the British from Egypt, enforc-
* Târiq al-Bishrî, DustOr 1923 bayna al-qasr wa al-wafd
[The Constitution of 1923 Between the Palace and the Wafd],
in: Dirâsât fi al-dîmuqrâtiyya al-misriyya, p. 45.
Originally published in al-Katib 9 (1969) 98 pp. 15-26.
10 Târiq al-Bishrî, DustOr 1923 sira' hawl al-sulta
[The Constitution of 1923; the Struggle for Power], in:
Dirâsât fî al-dîmuqrâtiyya al-misriyya, p. 56. Originaly
published in al-Tall'a 8 (1972) 8 pp. 48-59.
11 Târiq al-Bishrî, Pustur 1923 sira' hawl al-sulta,
pp. 55-74.
12 The so-called minority parties are the Liberal
Constitunalist Party, the Ittihad Party, and the Sa'di
Party. Most of them had split off from the Wafd, or were
established by the monarchy.
ing ita interpretation of the Constitution, and taking
control of the state. Instead the power struggle between the
Wafd, the king and the British remained unresolved, and
reached a stalemate. Consequently the Wafd was only in
government for less than seven years during the whole liber-
al period.13
The Failed Revolution, 1945-1952
Tariq al-Bishri only refers to the period between 1924 and
1945 in passing. He notes the gradual decline of the Wafd as
a result of its compromises with the British in 1936 and
1942, and the rise of its right-wing rivals, the Society of
the Moslem Brothera (DJama'a al-IkhwSn al-Muslimln). and
Young Egypt (Hisr al-Fatat). Most of al-Bishri's attention
is focused on the rapid decline of the liberal system
between 1945 and 1952. This period he considers to be the
pivot around which modern Egyptian history revolves. The
crucial development in this period is the radlcalization of
the democratic nationalist movement, to the point that it
called for armed struggle against both the British Occupa-
tion and the Egyptian ruling classes. This implied a reject-
ion of the Wafd's limited goals of independence and formal
democracy to be attained by "peaceful legal means" of win-
ning elections and carrying on negotiations with the Brit-
ish.
Two important developments account for this radicali-
zation: after World War II a severe economic crisis made
itself felt, and Zionism began to pose a direct threat after
the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. The eco-
nomic crisis and the soaring inflation of the period after
World War II undermined the social and economic base on
which the political system of the Constitution of 1923
rested, a process that was enhanced by the attitude of the
bourgeoisie who refused reforms, seeking support from iaiper-
13 Tariq al-Bishrî, Thawra 1919 wa al-sulta al-
sivasiyya [The 1919 Revolution and Political Power], in:
Dirâsât fl al-dlmuqratiyya al-misriyya, pp. 77-106.
Originally published in al-K9tib 7 (1967) 79 pp. 91-107.
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ialism against the masses.14 The Zionist threat and the
Palestine War of 1948 made Egyptians aware for the first
time of their Arab identity and the international dimension
of the struggle against imperialism.15
Tarig al-Bishri's major work "The Political Movement
in Egypt 1945-1952" consists mainly of an analysis how the
different political currents met the demands of this period
conceptually and in practice. The thrust of his argument is
that two tendencies of democratic nationalist movement after
1945 were again divided among different political currents,
each adopting an aspect of, or contributing to its develop-
ment. Their dissension and factionalism precluded them from
carrying out the necessary revolution.
The communist movement ia one of the currents Tariq
al-Bishri regards as having contributed to the democratic
nationalist movement. It is credited for having produced the
theoretical framework for analyzing the contradictions of
Egyptian society in this period. Its main innovation con-
sisted of the notion that the struggle against imperialism
should be directed against the Britsh Occupation as well as
the Indigenous ruling classes. The landholding and the
industrialist classes, had formed by the second half of the
1940s an alliance with imperialism against the democratic
nationalist movement. In short, the communist movement
contributed the Idea that economic liberation is an insepar-
able part of political liberation.1'
Otherwise Tarlq al-Bishri's judgment of the communist
movement is negative. In fact his criticism foreshadows the
withering attack he made on the communist movement in his
later book "Moslems and Copts within the Framework of the
National Community", published In the 1980s ,17 This nega-
14 Târiq al-Bishrî,"al-Haraka al-siyâsiyya fi miar
1945-1952" [The Political Movement in Egypt 1945-1952], pp.
181-207.
15 Ibid., 233-274.
16 Ibid., pp. 76-79.
17 al-MuslinOn wa al-'agbât fi 'itar al-djama'a al-
wataniyya. Dar al-ShrOq, Cairo, 1982.
tlve evaluation of the communist movement stems from his
belief that "the communist movement was more apt than other
political currents in finding a political formulation for
determining its social goals and the means to realize them
by applying its scientific concept of imperialism and social
division of classes. But the determination of general poli-
tical formulas is easier than executing them in practice and
making their detailed evaluation In political life".1" He
holds the foreign character of the movement responsible for
this situation. This, and its inexperience isolated it from
society and the masses: "The new, whatever change it might
bring about, is bound to the general existing frame of
reference and the general political ideological frame of
reference in society. Innovation even if it is sui generis
must be related...to the awareness of national customs, the
historical heritage (al-turâth al-tä'rlkhl), common values,
that is, the special mixture of ideological and emotional
attitudes of the masses".1'
On account of its abstract ideas the communist move-
ment made serious mistakes. In international affairs it
exaggerated the danger the United States posed after the
Second World Kar, neglected the opportunities of benefitting
from inter-imperialist rivalry between the United States and
Great Britain, while it confined its trust in the socialist
block.20 The communist movements most desastreus political
step was its acceptance of the partition plan of Palestine,
an inexcusable and a typical error, according to al-
Biehri.21 In domestic affairs it tended to confuse issues by
ascribing the policies of the different political parties
exclusively to their class base, or worse, characterizing
Young Egypt as a fascist party on account of its relations
l' Ibid., p. 112.
l« Ibid., p. 115.
" Ibid., pp. 161-162.
21 Ibid., pp. 262-264.
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with the Palace.22 Like so many other aspects of the ideo-
logy of the communist movement, these serious errors stemmed
from the habit of slavishly applying European concepts and
analysis to the Egyptian situation.
The ideological rigidity < djjumQd ) of the communist
movement was underscored by its organizational chaos,
divided as it was in a multitude of small cells and splint-
ers as a result of infighting and extreme secretiveness.23
The only two groups for which Tariq al-Bishri expresses his
sympathy are HAMITU (later HADITU)24 and Tail's al-'UmmSl
( The Vanguard of the Workers), mainly on account of their
stronger relations with the labor movement, their more
restricted ties with foreign intellectuals, and their wil-
lingness to subordinate themselves In a national front under
the Wafd's leadership in the struggle for a national demo-
cratic revolution,25
If the communist movement failed in the execution of
its tasks but is redeemed for at least having made a crucial
theoretical and an attempted practical contribution to the
democratic nationalist movement, the Moslem Brotherhood Is
described in "The Political Movement" as woefully lacking in
both theoretical finesse and democratic structure. Al-Bishri
squarely puts the Brotherhood in the camp of the reaction.
He believes the Brotherhood was the tool of the reaction in
its struggle against the democratic nationalist movement,
especially after the weight of the movement had shifted to
the extra-parliamentary currents after World War II. In
almost all the major political events of the forties, like
the workers and student movement of 1946 and the national
fronts at the end of the forties and the beginning of the
22 Ibid., p. 163.
23. Ibid., p. 110 and p. 420.
24 HAMITU stands for al-Haraka al-Misriyya 11 al-
Taharrur al-Watanl [The Egyptian Movement for the National
Liberation}; HADITU for al-Haraka al-Dlmuqratiyya li al-
Taharrur al-Watanl [The Democratic Movement for the National
Liberation],
25 Ibid., pp. 157-161 and pp. 222-223.
11
fifties, the Brotherhood either aided with the minority
governments or took a neutral stand.26 Even after the sup-
pression of the Brotherhood in 1948 and the murder of its
leader Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhood stood aloof from the
guerrilla warfare along the Suez Canal against the British,
directing its strike forces to the holy battle (al-ma'raka
al-muqaddasa) against cafés, brothels, and corruption.27
Al-Bishri explains the contradiction between this
political attitude and the immense following the Brotherhood
acquired during the forties to the appeal of its backward
looking salafiyya ideology for those classes which had lost
out socially and economically and had nothing to expect of
the future.2* The obscurantism IghumQd) of its ideology
contained neither an analysis of society nor a definition of
the organization's own character and goals. The Islamic
system (al-nizam al-islamt) never was explained, except in
the most general terras.29 It seemed as if vagueness had
become a goal in itself. The Brotherhood tried to define
Itself in statements as "the Brotherhood is a salafiyya
call...a sufl tarlqa...a political organization...an ath-
letic club... a cultural and scientific association...an
economic enterprise.. .a social concept".30 Where a clear
social economic analysis was called for, the Brotherhood
presented "religious enthusiasm" (widjdSn dlnî) that attri-
buted every problem society was afflicted with to "the wave
of apostasy" (al-mawdja al-ilhadiyya).31 Consequently the
Brotherhood lacked a socio-economic program, though Sayyid
Qutb and others were to incorporate socialist ideas in the
fifties.32 If the Brotherhood did take a stand, this was
'• Ibid., pp. 85-90 and pp. 108-109.
27 Ibid., p. 373-377 and p. 530.
21 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
" Ibid., p. 58.
30 Ibid., p. 53.
31 Ibid., p. 44.
32 Ibid., pp. 377-381.
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usually confused. Characteristically the Brotherhood analyz-
ed the struggle against Zionism and Israel as a struggle of
Islam against Jewry, thereby recognizing the imperialist
division of the Middle East into sects (tawa'if).33 More-
over, the Brotherhood took advantage of other Ideologies as
Arablsm for its own opportunistic purposes.34
The Brotherhood's ideological obscurantism was match-
ed by a dictatorial structure that demanded total obedience.
Al-B±shri believes the foundations for the organization of
the Brotherhood were laid during the congress of 1935 when a
resolution was adopted demanding every Moslem to believe
that the program of the Brotherhood embodied Islam, and that
every diversion from it was an offence against Islam.5 5
Besides giving free rein to the personal despotism of the
leadership and unleashing the terrorist organization, the
secret apparatus (al-djihSz al-sirrî), this exclusive at-
titude ruled out any cooperation in a national front with
other political currents.36
On the other hand, when al-Blshri turns his attention
to Young Egypt he is surprisingly mild. He rejects the
leftist description of Young Egypt as a fascist party which
cooperated, like the Brotherhood, with the Palace and the
reactionary minority parties,37 What seems to appeal to al-
Blshri in Young Egypt is its extreme nationalist program of
the 1930s. With approval he quotes the famous passage from
Plan Qirsh: "Remove everything that is foreign in this coun-
try from the depth of your heart, and become fanatic in
33 Ibid., p. 251.
34 Ibid., p. 256.
35 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
36 Ibid., p. 384.
37 Rif"at al-Sa'id,"Ahmad Husayn, kalimat wa muwâqif"
[Ahmad Husayn, Words and Opinions], Cairo, 1979; "Abd al-
"Azlnt Ramadan, "Tatawwur al-haraka al-watanlyya fI misr min
sana 1937 'lia sana 1948" [The Development of the Egyptian
Nationalist Movement from the Year 1937 to the Year 1948],
vol. I Beirut, 1974, pp. 175-215.
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your nationalism to the point of becoming mad",3" Al-Bishri
traces the tortuous route Young Egypt followed from a
nationalist monarchist phase In the thirties to an Islamic
phase in the beginning of the forties, finally ending up as
the Egyptian Socialist Party in 1949, when it found the
right balance between nationalist demands, a socialist
economic program, and the invocation of Islam. Accordingly
it had by that time dropped its old slogan "Allah... al-
Batan...al-Malik" (Allah...the Nation...the King) in favor
of, "Allah...al-Sha'b" {Allah...the People).3* Especially in
Its regard for Egypt's cultural and Islamic heritage Young
Egypt compared favorably with the communist movement. Thus
most of the social and economic reforms were stated in
Islamic terms as, "Islam forbids rent, therefore it forbids
capitalism".40
Nevertheless, al-Bishri is most severe in his critic-
ism of Young Egypt's organization and strategy. As with so
many other Egyptian political parties Young Egypt depended
upon personal leadership (al-za'ama al-fardiyya), instead of
patiently putting together a political organization by
educating and training its cadre end the masses. This pre-
vented the party from leading the masses at crucial events,
as during the guerrilla warfare along Canal Zone and the
spontaneous uprising of the masses during the burning of
Cairo on 26 January 1952, which al-Bishri considers one of
the rare historic opportunities missed for a real revolut-
ion.41 He holds all the political currents directly respons-
ible for this lost opportunity to organise the masses into a
revolutionary force.*2
J" Tariq al-Bishrî, al-Karaka al-siySsiyya fî misr
1945-1952, p. 226.
" Ibid., pp. 227-228 and pp. 389-391.
40 Ibid., pp. 392-393.
41 Ibid., pp. 409-410 and pp. 520-531.
42 Ibid-, pp. 523-530.
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The Revolution of 23 July 1952 and the Failure of
Dictatorship
In his analysis of the July Revolution al-Bishri poses the
same question he addresses to each of the other political
currents: did it comply with the demands of the democratic
nationalist movement as they had evolved after the Second
World War in its foreign, socio-economic, and democratic
policy? The fact that al-Bishri analyzes the Revolution of
the 23rd of July in these terms at the end of the 1970s and
during the 1980s proves that these issues still form an
important part of his theory of history.
Al-Bishri carefully examines all three issues separ-
ately. He comes out in favour of the regime where its
foreign policy is concerned, believing the regime completely
fulfilled the demands of the democratic nationalist move-
ment. The regime realized that Zionism had become the main
threat to Egypt, and therefore solved the Sudanese crisis by
signing a treaty with the British that met Egypt's economic
exigencies and ensured ita security on its southern flank.43
Also the regime's pan-Arab policy was more in tune with the
times than the Wafd's narrow Egyptian nationalist outlook.**
On the other hand, the treaty it signed with Great Britain
for the evacuation of its military forces along the Suez
Canal fell short of the demands of the nationalist movement,
by accepting a military pact for seven years. But it should
be evaluated, according to al-Bishri, in view of the
regime's subsequent anti-imperialist policy: the condemn-
41 TSriq al-Bïshrî, Thawra 23 yülyu wa tatwlr al-haraka
al-watanlyya [The Revolution of July 23 and the Development
of the Nationalist Movement], in: Dirasât fl al-dlmuqratiyya
al-misriyya, pp. 127-141. Originally published as Thawra
vQlvO wa al-haraka al-wataniyya [The Revolution of July 23
and the Nationalist Movement] al-Hilal, August 1984, pp. 11-
19.
44 TSriq al-Bishrl, Thuiath muiahazat 'an al-haraka al-
dlmuqrätiyya fl misr [Three Remarks on the Democratic
Movement in Egypt], in: "DirSsa ft al-dîmuqrâtiyya al-
misriyya", pp. 249-251. Al-Bishri states in this article
that the liberation of the Arab nation is not possible
without the abolishment of Zionism [p. 249]. For his other
statements on Palestine: al-MuslimOn wa al-'aqbat, p. 572,
pp. 579-581, and pp. 587-588.
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ation of the Bagdad Pact; becoming one of the leading un-
aligned nations during the Bandung Conference; making the
Czech arms deal; and finally establishing its nationalist
and pan-Arab credentials during the Suez War in 1956.45
If the regime demolished the constraints on Egyptian
foreign policy which imperialism had imposed, it did the
same with the internal restrictions which the reactionary
ruling classes placed upon economic development and social
justice. In accordance with the insight of the democratic
nationalist movement it realized that economic independence
is a prerequisite for political Independence. The land
reforms and the nationalization of major industries and
commercial enterprises the regime implemented should be
regarded in that light."
However, the authoritarian manner in which the goals
of the democratic nationalist movement were realized event-
ually Jeopardized the whole enterprise. Whereas the demo-
cratic nationalist movement had always maintained that
nationalist goals could not be attained without democracy,
these two became separated in the mind of the general public
once the regime's nationalist credentials were established.
As a result, democracy became looked upon as an impediment
for the realization of nationalist goals.47
The regime's nationalist and economic policies coin-
cided with the enormous increase of power of the executive
at the expense of the legislative. In its aversion to the
45 Târiq al-Bishrl, Thawra vOlyO wa tatwlr al-haraka
al-wataniyya. pp. 134-137.
4* Ibid., pp. 137-139. For a summing up of the
achievements of the Revolution of July 23 which al-Bishri
calls "a national liberation revolution" (thawra taharrur
watant): Târiq al-Bishrt, "al-Dîmuqrâtiyya wa nizarn 23
yOlyO" [Democracy and the System of the Revolution of July
23], Beirut, 1987, pp. 117-118.
47 Ibid., p. 140; TSriq al-Bishrl, Thawra 23 yulyu wa
qadiyya al-dlmuqrfitiyya [The Revolution of July 23 and the
Question of Democracy), in: al-Dîmuqrâtlyya fl misr; rub'
qarn ba'da thawra 23 yOlyO [Democracy in Egypt; a Quarter
Century after the Revolution of July 23], 1977, p. 19.
Published by the Center for Political and Stategic Studies
of al-Ahram.
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ancien régime the Revolutionary Command Council not only
eliminated the monarchy and the large landowners, but also
abolished the 1923 Constitution, the multi-party system, and
all the civil liberties which the Constitution of 1923 had
guaranteed before 1952. In its place it initiated poor
substitutes. In the seven different constitutions the regime
promulgated between 1953 and 1969 the legislative lost its
independence and at times merged with the executive. The
constitution provided no checks and balances. The president
was elected by referendum, he appointed ministers who were
responsible to him alone, and he could dissolve parliament
at will.48 The executive was enhanced by the successive
political organizations which the new regime erected: the
Nationalist Rally, the Nationalist Union, and finally the
Arab Socialist Union, which never were invested with any
political power. Rather than attracting the masses and
including them in the decision-making process, these or-
ganizations were intended to keep them at bay. Real power
was monopolized by the executive to which these political
organizations were subordinated.49 It stands to reason that
within this context the Independence of the judiciary was
completely eroded.50
The regime evaded the central issue of democracy by
erecting different parallel competitive bureaucratic insti-
tutions. This development led to the rise of what later were
called "the power centers" (al-tnaraklz al-quwa).51 As the
power of the regular bureaucracy itself was gradually usurp-
ed by the proliferating secret services and the military
establishment in the 1960s, politics became confused with
security.52 The secret services took over such highly poli-
tical cases as the Committee for the Abolishment of Feudal -
48 Târlq al-Bishrl, al-Dîmuqratiyya wa nizam 23 yOlyQ,
pp. 104-111.
4' Ibid., pp. 128-132 and pp. 137-144.
50 Ibid., p. 106.
51 Ibid., p. 152 and pp. 152-156.
52 Ibid., p. 164.
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ism. Repression was applied where more democratic means
could have tapped creative sources of criticism,.as was the
case with the repression of the communist movement in 1959-
1960 and the Moslem Brotherhood in 1964-1965.53 Fear and
terror were instilled into the people by the regime's exag-
geration of the threat external enemies posed for the revol-
ution at a time when the revolution had already established
its credentials, and its real enemies, like Sadat, were to
emanate from the system itself, not from outside.54
Finally the June War of 1967 brought the regime down
and reintegrated the nationalist and democratic strains of
the nationalist movement in the mind of the public. Al-
Bishri draws the conclusion that: "The defeat of June 5 and
its sequence had disclosed that even when it is possible to
achieve independence without democracy, political democracy
is necessary to retain national independence in its politic-
al and economic forma".55
However, the defeat had changed the domestic and
international circumstances in which this awareness could be
put into practice. During the past two decades Egypt has
increasingly lost its independence. To regain the Sinai
Egypt had to relinquish its Arab plans for renaissances
(mihOd), Independence, and political and social unity.56 In
its economic policy it sold out to imperialism by initiating
the infitäh, while the Implementation of democratic reforms
have been cosmetic and an inducement to internal dissension.
The "Permanent Constitution" of 1971 has confirmed the
prerogatives of the president, precluding a shift of power
in favour of parliament on the basis that the people are the
53 Ibid., p. 170.
54 Ibid., 172.
55 TSriq al-Bishrl, Thawra yulyu wa tatwtr al-haraka
al-wataniyya. pp. 140-141.
56 Tariq al-Bishrl, al-DImuqratiyya wa nizarn Thawra 23
yOlyÛ, p. 186.
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source of all power.57 In an article al-Bishri wrote in 1981
he expressed his disappointment in the multi-party system,
which only reproduced the division between the political
currents as they existed before 1952. Democracy had become a
goal in Itself, whereas it should always be subordinated to
economic, political and spiritual Independence.5 e
57 Târiq al-Bishrl, Thawra yOlyu wa qadiyya al-
dtmuqrâtiyya, p. 22; Târiq al-Bishrî, Mulâhazât haw l 'idäd
al-dustQr al-dâ'lm [Some Remarks on the Preparation of the
Permanent Constitution], in: Diras§t fî al-dlmuqrâtiyya al-
misriyya, pp. 219-233. This article was Intended to be
published in al-Katib in 1971, but was rejected by the censor.
58 Târiq al-B±shrî, ThulSth muiahazât 'an al-haraka al-




A Definition of the Concepts al-wflfid and al-«awruth
In the 1980s al-Bishri developed a pair of concepts which he
believes have greatly helped him to understand modern Egypt-
ian and Middle Eastern history. These concepts are al-wafid
and al-mawrflth, which can best be translated as 'that which
is coming from the outside and is alienating', and 'that
which is Inherited from the ancestors'.
In order to situate the development of the two con-
cepts better al-Bishri wrote in the introduction of the
second edition of the "The Political Movement in Egypt 1945-
1952" :
I only now begin to understand what I have not been able
to understand during the 1960s when I was preparing this
book, i.e. there exists a general and important prin-
ciple in the delimination of the social and political
map of Egypt and the determination of the course of
history of Egypt during the past century. This principle
is that the course of the Egyptian history and the
social movement in whatever period are not only deter-
mined by the struggle between the nationalist movement
and imperialism, nor are they only determined by the
social struggle between classes with different inter-
ests, but they ere also determined by the ideological
struggle ial-sira' al-'aqâ'iai) between al-wafid and al-
mawrOth."
What these concepts mean and how they relate to each other
al-Bishri tries to explain in the following passage:
The turath (the heritage) consists of values, organ-
izations, ideas, customs, morals and culture which have
s' TSriq al-Bishrl, Introduction to the second issue of
"al-Haraka al-siyaslyya fl misr 1945-1952", p. 42. This will
be referred to henceforth as "The Introduction".
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been bequeathed to the present society by previous
generations. This definition of the turath applies to
every society, as long as its present is historically
tied to the previous generations and is derived from it,
and as long as the distinction between the turath and
the mu'Sslra (the contemporary) is one of time in which
the latter is derived from the first. But I can hardly
maintain that what we call contemporary in values,
organizations, and ideas, etc., has derived from our
past, distinguishing itself only by a lapse in time; on
the contrary, it has come from outside, assaulting us
(innamâ wafada ilayna igtihgrnan) and rendering a rupture
with that past.'0
For Moslems it is imperative to recover the turath, for
imperialism has tried to obliterate it, and without it true
independence is unattainable:
The Importance of this case is that our struggle with
imperialism does not only have bearing on something
outside ourselves. We as human community are the subject
of the struggle, not Just a part of it. Imperialism
demands not only our land, devoid of us, but it demands
[to control] us and what we possess. Any opposltional
movement of ours can only be founded and developed on
our strong distinctiveness (tamayyuz wathtq) in identity
(huwiyya) and allegiance (intima'), in order that we
become aware of our society in its specificity and its
self-contalnedness (Istlqiai). This is unobtainable for
us, unless we acquire a strong sense of our distinctive
history and the awareness of the totality of Ideological
and cultural inheritance in us (mudjmal al-mawrflth al-
flkrl wa al-hadarl flna).'1
60 Tarlq al-Bishrl, Nahnu...bayna al-mawruth wa al-
wafld [We...between the Heritage and the Alienated] In:
'Ishltaliyya al-'ulQm al- ' iaJtimS' iyya fl al-watan al-'arabl
[The Problematic of Social Sciences in the Arab Nation],
Cairo, 1983, p. 359.
61 Tariq al-Bishrl, "The Introduction", p. 41.
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These quotations indicate that according to al-Bishri cult-
ures are self-enclosed and mutually exclusive. Each has an
independent development with a logic of its own. This does
not necessarily mean that Islamic culture is superior to
Western culture, nor that it cannot adopt different items
from the West; it only means both cultures are basically
different and can only adopt those aspects of other cultures
which are not contradictory to it and can be absorbed. The
difference, according to al-Bishri, between Western culture
and Islamic culture is that Europe has never been threatened
from outside and has developed "by interaction of its own
elements" (bi ta'fg'ul al-'anaslr al-dhatiyya), whereas
Islamic culture has been assaulted by Western culture from
the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the result
that a dual < IzdiwSdj ) society has arisen with two sectors
which exist side by side, a Western one and an Islamic one,
both with their own school system. Judiciary, atatescraft,
attitudes, values, etc.'2
Until very recently the struggle between these two
sectors, between al-wafid and al-mawrQth, had been dominated
by al-waf id, which employed all the Western ideological
concepts and theoretical paraphernalia for the purpose of
annihilating the turath. Especially effective was the method
of using the term "contemporary" (mu'Ssira) with the con-
notation of progressive and modern for all things Western,
while associating the remnants of the turSth with "backward-
ness" (takhalluf )." Similarily, all those political and
social forces in Egyptian history which resisted the Western
cultural onslaught were considered "reactionary" (radj'l]
and out of place. Al-Bishri believes that this major flaw in
the contemporary sociological and historical analysis of
Egypt derives from the Western practice of rigidly associat-
ing certain political organizations and movements with a
certain socio-economic formation. Thus religious movements
are associated with feudalism and are therefore reactionary;
" Ibid., p. 363.
63 Ibid., pp. 361-362, p. 374.
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liberalism is associated with capitalism; whereas Marxism
and socialism are associated with the working class and are
consequently progressive. This attitude precludes an analys-
is which takes Into account different circumstances and
historical developments. Instead of looking at ideologies
one should look at the programs and practice of these
organizations.*4 If al-nahda is the goal, and the retrléve-
ntent of the turftth one of its preconditions, than the con-
cepts al-tnawruth and al-wSfid provide the key to understand-
ing these forces and reclaiming them from the dust bin of
history. These concepts show that even if al-mawrOth organ-
izations, like the Azhar, can be considered politically
reactionary, they fulfilled a progressive ideological funct-
ion by holding on to the turSth. In addition, this pair of
concepts shows that in a dual society economic and social
interests can cut across ideological differences; reaction-
ary and authentic forces can be found both in secular and
religious circles.65 Once this is realized, al-Bishri seems
to suggest, the foundation is laid for mutual recognition of
the authentic forces in Egyptian politics and the awareness
of the necessity for a common struggle for the liberation of
Egypt and the Islamic world from political, economic, as
well as cultural subjection by the West.**
The Application of the Concepts al-wSfid and al-aawruth to
E gyp t ian _jtl atgr%
Islam and the Westernization of Egypt
Basic to the understanding of al-Bishrlfs theory of history
is the idea that Islamic society has been left in tact until
the nineteenth century, its unifying factor having been
fr* Tarlq al-Bishrl, Thulath mulahazSt 'an al-haraka al-
dlmuqratiyya fl rnlsr, pp. 253-256.
65 Ibid., pp. 254-255; Târlq al-Bishrl,"al-dîmuqrâtiyya
wa nizSm 23 yOlyU", pp. 34-35; Tariq al-Bishri, "al-MuslimUn
wa al-'aqbat", pp. 648-650,
6* Tariq al-Bishrî,"The Introduction", p. 48; Muhammad
MurQw,"Tariq al-Bishri shahld *alS suqût al-'llmânlyya"
[Tariq al-Bishri Witness to the Fall of Secularism] Cairo,
1985, p. 7 and p. 9,
23
provided by the sharl'a. In view of the central role of the
shart *a al-Bishri divides Islamic history into.a period of
foundation (ta'sll) and legislation (tashrl') during the
time of the prophet and the rightly guided caliphs, and a
period of application (tatblq). which covers the rest of the
thirteen centuries of Islamic history. According to this
divison, in the first period the Quran and Sunna laid down
the principles (al-ahkam) which are "unhistorical" (ghayra
ta ' rlhhiyya ), not confined by time and place, while during
the second period Moslems tried to interprète and apply
these principles with various measures of success.67
Closely connected with centrality of the shari'a is
the political notion of the Islamic community (ai-djamâ'a
al-islamiyya), on which the succesive Islamic empires were
founded. The last empire based on the Bhari'a was the Otto-
man empire, which staved off the Western onslaught until the
nineteenth century when it paradoxically became both the
passageway of imperialist penetration and the defender of
the Islamic community."
Al-Bishri cites the Tanzimat in the Ottoman Empire as
an example of how Western concepts applied as "reforms" to a
completely different environment in the end only helped
imperialism. He believes: "The Tanzimât was but a Western
cloak thrown over the body of a pure Eastern state" (al-
tanzlmât kânat mudjarrad thawb gharbl musi'gr 'aia djlsro
dawla sharqivya samlma).'9 Al-Bishri calls the Western
** TSriq al-Bishrî, Hal ghSbat al-sharî'a ba'da 'ahd
al-rSshidln?! [Has the Shari'a Disappeared After the Era of
the Rightly Guided Caliphs 111, al-Sha'b 7/7/1987, p. 6, and
al-Sha'b 14/7/1987, p. 6; also interview TSriq al-Bishri
with Muhammad Nur FarahSt, Hawl qadiyya tatblq al-sharl'a wa
al-mawqif min al-tafrîhh [On the Case of the Application of
the Shari'a from the Historical Point of View], al-Sha'b
22/9/1987, p. 6.
'ahd*• TSriq al-Bishrî, Hal ghabat al-sharl'a ba'da
al-rashldun, al-Sha'b 14/7/1987, p 6.
" Târiq al-Bishrî, al-Mas'ala al-qändnlyva bayna al-
sharî'a al-iBlâmiyya wa al-qânQn al-wad'l, [The Legal
Question Between the Islamic Shari'a and Positive Law], in:
al-sayyid Yassln éd., "al-turâth wa tahdiyyât al-'asr fî al-
watan al-'arabl" [The Heritage and Contemporary Challenges
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models for reform "the falsehood coming from outside" ( al-
wafld al-dall).™
If Western reforms failed In resuscitating the Otto-
man Empire, neither did the pan-Islamic policy of Abd al-
Hamid II succeed in using the turath as bulwark against
Western penetration. Instead of uniting Moslems in the world
against Imperialism, the reawakening of the caliphate at the
end of the nineteenth century was a device to subject non-
Turkish citizens of the Ottoman Empire to Turkish despotism.
In fact, al-Bishri believes, the racist and despotic
character of the Ottoman Empire severely weakened the Islam-
ic movement in its struggle against the West.71
In comparison, al-Bishri believes the developments in
Egypt during the nineteenth century are decidedly more
authentic. As a guideline for political practice and thought
the concept of the Islamic community remained in tact and
was not seriously challenged until the end of the century.
In contrast to so many other Egyptian historians and his
earlier opinion, al-Bishri believes that neither the de-
struction of the Ottoman empire nor the rise of Egyptian
nationalism prompted Muhammad All's campaign in Syria at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Its sole purpose was to
strengthen the Islamic community.72
Similarily, the Urabi Revolution represented the
expression of an authentic democratic nationalist resistence
against British Imperialism. The slogan "Egypt for the
Egyptians" expressed the idea of brotherhood (flkra akhwa),
not an abstract nationalist model adopted from the West. As
such it was not in contradiction with the more comprehensive
concept (al-mafhOm al-ashmal) of the Islamic community which
in the Arab Nation] Seirout, 1985, p. 634.
'° Tariq al-Bishrl, Nahnu...bayn al-mawrOth via al-
wafid, p. 364.
71 TSrlq al-Bishrî,"al-Muslimun wa al-'aqbat", p. 658.
72 Târiq al-Bishrî,"The Introduction", pp. 28-31; TSriq
al-Bishrl, al-Mas'ala al-qanOniyya bayna al-sharl'a al-
islämlyya »a al-qänOn al-wad'I. p. 623.
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the Ottoman Empire heralded.73
Nevertheless, Egypt was subjected to political,
economic, and cultural Western dominance throughout the
nineteenth century, which gradually split society into a
parallel (izdiwadj) society. The foundations for its un-
ravelling were laid during the Muhammad All period, when
Western institutions were introduced next to existing Islam-
ic ones.74 Imitation (taqlld) of the Western models started
In the sixties and seventies, under khédive Isma'ïl, when
the "French disease" began to afflict Egyptian society. But
even then it remained largely restricted to external fea-
tures of life: clothing, houses, food, etc.75 Only at the
end of the last century and the beginning of this century,
al-Bishri believes, did Nestern philosophical, political and
social ideas acquire a hold over the minds of Egyptians and
did the allegiance (intima^) to the broader concept of the
Islamic community find itself gradually supplanted by a
secular more narrowly based allegiance to the national
community.7*
From that time onward the dialectical process of al-
wâfid and al-mawrflth became manifest in its different and
unexpected ways. The pivot around which this struggle was
fought was the sharl'a and its increasingly marginalized
position in Egyptian society. Al-Bishri believes its margin-
alizatlon was not the result of Its Inherent rigidity
(rukfld), for the aharl'a had by that tine already been
codified in the Ottoman Madjalla, which could have been
applied. Rather Its marginalization should be attributed to
foreign political and economic interests, which intended to
subjugate Egypt by annihilating its cultural defences and
73 Târiq al-Bishrî,
74 Ibid., p. 29.
75 Ibid., pp. 32-33
" Ibid., 34.
"The Introduction", pp. 30-32,
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separating it from the Ottoman Empire.77 Having been pushed
in a defensive position, those social and political forces
which wanted to retain the turath became conservative in
religious and social matters, looking to the Ottoman Empire
for support against the political and cultural onslaught by
the West. On account of this attitude they were caught
between Western reforms which did not take the Islamic
heritage into account, and a strongly conservative immobil-
ized Ottoman Empire.7fl
This background explains the refusal of the 'ularna'
to reform Islamic law and practice idjtihâd. Afraid to lose
the very basis (TusQl) of Islam if they accepted reforms,
they simply refused cooperation, even with seriously minded
Egyptian reformers like Muhammad Abduh," It also resolves
the perceived internal contradictions of the Umma Party as
the party of democratic but pro-British sympathies, and the
Nationalist Party as the party with pan-Islamic and despotic
tendencies. Once it is recognized that there is no logical
connection between secular nationalism and progresslveness,
and other issues as mass following are addressed, the Umma
Party can safely be called a reactionary party on account of
its elite status, the social base of the party, and its
cooperation with the British. At the same time the National-
ist Party acquires a more positive image based on its reten-
tion of the turath and its mass following, despite Its
77 Târiq al-Bishrî, al-mas'ala al-qanOniyya bayna al-
sharl'a al-islSmiyya wa al-qanOn al-wad'l, pp. 617-622;
Tariq al-Bishrl, Hawl haraka al-tadjdld fl al-tashrî' al-
isiaml fl misr [On the Reform Movement in Islamic Law in
Egypt], in: al-Hiwar, 1 (1986) 1, pp. 98-110.
7< TSriq al-Bishrî, Hawl haraka al-tadjdld fl al-
tashrl' al-islamt fl misr, p. 104 and pp. 107-108; Tarlq
al-Bishrl, al-hidhr rain al-tadjdld wa al-di'aya al-siyasiyya
[The Caution for Reform and Political Propaganda ], al-Sha'b
17/12/1985, p. 7.
" Ibid., 100-103; Tariq al-Bishrî, Hal kanat djumud
al-fuqaha' sabab al-'udOl 'an al-sharl'aT [Was the Rigidity
of the Islamic Jurisprudents Responsible for the
Renunciation of the Shari'a?], al-Sha'b, 10/12/1985, p. 7.
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Support of the khédive and the Ottoman Empire.60
In final analysis, the religious and non-religious
attitudes of different social and political organizations
are determined by political and economic considerations
within the prevailing circumstances in which these organiza-
tions find themselves.'1 In this light the ambitions of
kings Fa'ud I and Faruq 1 of Egypt during the twenties and
thirties to acquire the caliphate had less to do with relig-
ion as such than with their international ambitions and
their fear of the secular democratic nationalist movement
represented by the Wafd. The support the kings received from
the Azhar, similarly, derived from the weakened economic and
social position of the shaykhs which they associated with
the Wafd and secular nationalism.*2 Conversely, the Party of
the Liberal Constitutionalists, having always presented
itself as the most enlightened secular liberal wing of
Egyptian nationalism, used Islamic slogans against the Wafd,
accusing it of being dominated by Copts, as soon as it felt
threatened.»3
The Authentic In Political Movements in the Period 1919-1952
Al-Bishri recognizes only two authentic political organ-
izations In the period 1919-1952: the Nafd and the Moslem
Brotherhood. That the Wafd is deemed authentic seems stran-
ge, considering the final breakthrough of the concept of
the allegiance to the narrow Egyptian national community
under its helm. Nevertheless, there are several features of
the Wafd's Ideology and organization which have, according
to al-Bishri, strong roots in the turath. Foremost among
these is the concept of national unity between Copts and
Moslems. All through the nineteenth and the beginning of
•° Târiq al-Bishrl,"The Introduction", pp. 35-36; Tariq
al-Bishrî, Nahnu...bayn al-mawrOth wa al-wafld, p. 256.
91 Târiq al-Bishrl, Thulâth mulahazêt 'an al-
dtrouqratiyya fl mlar, p. 255.
'2 Tariq al-Bishrl, "al-MuslimUn wa al-'aqbat", pp. 275-
312.
Ibid., p. 198 and pp. 201-202
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twentieth century British imperialism tried to split Egypt-
ian society into sects ftawâ'if) in order that it could
control Egypt better. The 1919 Revolution definitely frus-
trated this effort, which also ran counter to Islamic law.'4
Important also is the fact that the Waf d was the result of a
broad spontaneous national uprising which prevented it from
modelling itself after a Western example, and gave it a near
religious unanimity by bestowing upon it the consensus of
the nation (idjaa al-'ultima).'5 Similarily, the Wafd did not
consider itself a party, but rather as the organization of
the whole Umma (al-nlzSm al-djaml' 11 al-umma), of which it
was the mandatary <al-wakll ). This was expressed in the
structure of the party and the manner in which Its members
were chosen.*6 Finally, the Wafd and its ideology acquired
legitimacy by conducting a revolution at a time when the
Islamic movement, given the national and international
circumstances, was Incapable of performing such a task.87
Secularism acquired as it were its historical role by
default of the Islamic movement.
The most spectacular aspect of al-Bishri's new
theory is undoubtedly his revision of his description of the
Moslem Brotherhood. Al-Bishri reproves himself in his Intro-
duction to the second version of "The Political Movement in
Egypt 1945-1952" for having completely misjudged the Bro-
therhood. In the past he had looked at It from the outside
(al-nazar al-khSridjI), that is, through the eyes of secu-
larism, and especially through the eyes of the communist
movement. But he now understands "that the Brotherhood was
14 Ibid., pp. 133-140.
•5 Tariq al-Bishrï, Nahnu bayna al-mawrCth wa al-wafid,
pp. 370-371.
" Ibid., 371-372.
*7 Târiq al-Bishrl, Bayna al-djam'a al-dtnlyya wa al-
djflm* a al-watanlyya ft al-flkr al-slyasl [Between the
Religious Community and the Nationalist Community in
Political Thought], in: "al-Sha*b al-wahid wa al-watan al-
wahid: dirâsa fî 'usOl al-wahda al-wataniyya" [One People
and One Nation: A Study of the Principles of National Unity,
Cairo, 1982, p. 51. A publication of the Center for
Political and Strategic Studies of al-Ahram.
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not motivated by independence, the constitution, or the
rejection of the existing system, but by tha conviction that
Islam Is a total system for life". In that sense it is
opposed to the secular camp which only pursues pragmatic
goals (ahdäf 'amaliyya)."
Once the Brotherhood is situated within the framework
of al-wafid and al-mawruth its whole attitude during the
monarchy becomes understandable and logical, and the accusa-
tion of qhumûd (obscurantism) and lack of a program (nags
al-barnamidj } evaporates."9 Al-Bishri argues that the
Brotherhood should not be Judged primarily by its struggle
for political and economic Independence and social Justice,
but on its struggle for Ideological and cultural independ-
ence, and the defence of identity and coheslveness.*0 The
Brotherhood did not reject the Hafd on account of its strug-
gle for independence, but because it was a source of alien
ideology (al-fikr al-wafid) with regard to the organization,
goals for the future and models for renaissances {nuhOd).9 '
The ideology of the Brotherhood was not, according to al-
Bishri, reactionary, for its return to the usOl derived from
its will to resist the Western onslaught, not simply as a
means to divert attention from more pressing political and
economic affairs.'2
Moreover, many of the Brotherhood's ideas are compat-
ible with those of the nationalist movement as expressed by
the Haf d or other secular organizations. The love for one's
country is endorsed by Hasan al-Banna, who holds the view
that it can contribute to liberation of the country as long
as it does not divert from the broader goals and religion.
'• Târiq al-Blshrl, "The Introduction", pp. 22-24.
•' Ibid., p. 43.
•° Ibid., p. 48.
*l Ibid., p. 55.
" Ibid., p. 56.
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The same applies to Arabism.93 In this regard the Brother-
hood was even more advanced than the Nafd by adhering to the
ideas of the radical movement after the Second World Har
when the Palestine War made Egyptians aware of their larger
allegiance (al-intima' al-ashmal) toward the Arab nation."
However, in less polemical passages than those writ-
ten in the Introduction, al-Bishri admits that the Moslem
Brotherhood fell short of its own goals, even if one places
it within the framework of al-wafid and al-mawrQth. In a
revealing passage in "Moslems and Copts" al-Bishri uses his
familiar metaphor of the shop in which the customer has a
choice between two categories of articles, the one al-wâfid,
and the other al-mawruth. Yet, this time he adds the element
of taqlld (imitation) and tahdlth (reform and renewal). It
is obvious that the Brotherhood has chosen for al-mawrQth,
but has it also chosen for tahdlth7 Al-Bishri's ultimate
answer is negative. Al-Bishri states that in itself to
choose between al-wafid and al-mawrOth is not Just a quest-
ion of pointing one of the two articles out, and taking it
home. The crux of the matter consists of developing a con-
sidered opinion consisting of a combination of articles,
which will bring forth liberation. Justice and prosperity.*5
Hasan al-Banna was incapable of developing a Judicious
opinion in this respect, too upset as he was by internal
dissension of the country: "Instead of going forward out of
curiosity, he recoiled in abhorrence and referred to every-
thing as buried in hell"."
Al-Bishri believes that to Judge the Brotherhood in
respect to idjtihad and djumOd (rigidity) is much more
fruitful than accusing it of ghumûd (obscurantism), as he
476.
" TSriq al-Blshrî, "el-MuslimOn wa al-aqbat", pp. 475-
•« Ibid., pp. 587-588.
'5 Ibid., p. 478.
's Ibid., p. 478.
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had done in the past.97 Al-Bishri distinguishes between two
currents of religion, the first which bases itself on
Idjtihad In order to make the sharl'a again into an effect-
ive force in life, and the other which tries to retain it
within the scholastic tradition of the last centuries,
thereby ellmating its influence on real life. It is apparent
from al-Blshri's account that he believes that the Brother-
hood refused in general to find a modus vivendi (ta'amul)
with reality and lost with this mental attitude the possibi-
lity to influence reality." This does not mean that it was
unaware of the dilemma, but in the end it chose for the
usQl, as all the the other religiously inspired movements
had done before it." Thus, the Brotherhood never discussed
how the eharl'a should be applied. 10° Finally, most
damaging of all, the Brotherhood and Hasan al-Banna never
made any effort to Integrate Copts within Islamic society
and to reassure them that Islam posed no threat to their
position, a very serious lapse because it endangered the
national unity, the basis of all struggle for liberation.101
In last ressort the Brotherhood's only real contribution
seems to have been to point out the necessity of retaining
the sharl'a.
To what degree al-Bishri's perspective on Egyptian
history has shifted, becomes even clearer when he reinter-
pretes the role the communist movement played during the
monarchy. The interesting aspect of his reInterpretation is
that the communist movement has reversed positions with the
Brotherhood. Whereas during the 1960s the Brotherhood had
*7 And so many other left wing or liberal historians
still do: Rlf'at al-Sa"ld, "Hasan al-Banna, mu'assls djama'a
al-'ikhwSn al-muslimln: mata.-kayfa..wa limädha? [Hasan al-
Bannâ, Founder of the Society of the Moslem Brotherhood:
When..How..and Why?], Cairo, 1977; 'Abd al-'AzIm Ramadan,
"al-'Ikhwan al-muslimun wa al-tanzlm al-sirrl" [The Moslem
Brotherhood and the Secret apparatus], Cairo, 1982.
" Ibid., pp. 480-481.
" Ibid., p. 482.
100 Ibid., p. 484.
101 Ibid., p. 486
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been the villain in history, that role is assigned to the
communist movement in the 1980s. The decisive factor is its
international allegiance (al-intimâ' al-'umaml) which in
al-BishrlTs new range of concepts has no meaning, because,
unlike the concepts of the national or Islamic community,
internationalism cannot represent authenticity.102 The basic
theoretical assumption of the communist movement, that class
solidarity is more important than national ties between
classes, al-Bishri rejects, for the situation of the working
class in the capitalist world is incomparable to the situa-
tion of the working class in the colonized world where the
liberation struggle holds a preeminent place.103
This point of view has serious consequences, because
it implies that the whole communist movement in Egypt and
its ideas were not only flawed, but also a ruse, a front,
used for other purposes than those stated. In his search for
authenticity it is not surprising that al-Bishri finds
justification for this idea in the predominant role Jews
played within the movement. He believes they established the
movement in Egypt to protect their privileged position and
to support Zionism. Neither the struggle against British
imperialism nor the Implementation of democratic and eco-
nomic reforms nor the call for "Egyptianization" {tamsîr )
were the driving forces behind the communist movement.
Otherwise how can one explain the fact that the communist
movement never really directed its forces against the Brit-
ish or the monarchy, and did its utmost to keep the leader-
ship in Jewish hands, al-Bishri asks himself. The communist
movement drew attention away from these issues by focusing
it on one theme: fascism. It used this term against the
Moslem Brotherhood and Young Egypt, both of which al-Bishri
by now has recognized as authentic forces.104
10Z Tariq al-Bishrî, Thulath muiahazât 'an haraka al-
dtmuqratiyya. p. 249.
103 Tariq al-Biahrî, "al-MuslimOn wa al-'aqbat", p. 630.
104 Ibid., pp. 603-639. Al-Bishri's ideas about Young
Egypt have hardly changed during this period: Tariq al-
Bishrl, Misr al-fatat - khamsun 'aman [Young Egypt - Fifty
33
The Nasserist State and the Destruction of the Egyptian Past
In describing the July Revolution within the new paradigm
al-Bishri refrains from going into great detail, but from
the general remarks he makes it is obvious that he believes
it is the lowest ebb in Egyptian history in the struggle
between al-wafid and al-mawruth, despite its achievements in
other fields. According to al-Bishri the July revolution,
especially during Its socialist phase in the sixties, was
the high point in Western influence. In a caustic passage in
"The Introduction" he describes how Western cultural pene-
tration impaired our Identity ( huwiyatunS), our communal
feelings (shu'Orung al-Jjama'I) and our allegiance
(Intima*). And how as a result, the struggle for independ-
ence and liberation were afflicted with disorder (khalal).
Host Important in this respect, al-Bishri states, were the
attempts during the past decades to erase our past and our
historical consciousness (wa'yunS al-ta'rlkhl).'°5 Despite
the fact that the regime's experiment was based on political
and economic independence, we had adopted our models for a
nahda (renaissance) from the West, with desastreus results,
ending in the the defeat in June 1967. Al-Bishri holds the
intelligentsia responsible for this outcome, for its members
restricted political debate to the choice whether a com-
munist or a capitalist system was preferable, neglecting the
struggle between al-mawruth and al-wafid.'ot
This neglect for the Ideological (al-'aqS'ldl) and
the cultural (al-hadart) struggle between al-uafld and al-
mawruth, becomes most marked in regard with the sharl'a. Al-
Bishri reproaches himself as well for having thought in the
past that Western law can provide better guarantees against
despotism and the infringement of Justice and freedom than
the sharl'a. What we called the reform of the administration
of Justice and law was in fact a destruction of our own
Years] al-Ahrâm 1/11/1983, p. 8.
105 TSriq al-Bishri, "The Introduction", p. 41.
106 Ibid., p. 42.
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laws. Generations of students have been sent to France to
study Roman law, while the reform of the sharî 'a has been
neglected. Eventually we have substituded the base (al-'asl)
for the temporary (al-tari').107
This neglect of the shart'a had grave Implications
for the development of different institutions in Egypt. Al-
Bishri1 s attributes institutional chaoa and arbitrariness in
Egypt to what could be called the "disarticulation" between
values and institutions. Western reforms have led to the
cleavage of duties and values derived from Western law on
the one hand, and cultural criteria and behaviour related to
Islamic culture on the other.108 Citing the Egyptian histor-
ian Ahmad 'Izzat 'Abd al-Karim, al-Bishri believes that
Western reforms have destroyed administrative institutions
without providing alternatives. If the original institutions
had developed freely, they would have brought forth shura
(consultation) as a representative body, and Egypt would not
have been obliged to adopt Western models. Egypt had known
homogeneous and cohesive institutions (mu'assasat al-muta-
djanaga wa al-mutamasaka) which had adjusted duties and
rights harmoniously. Those institutions, like the extended
family, the village, the neighbourhood, the guild, the
mosque and the tarlqa have been destroyed by the introduc-
tion of new law systems lal-nuzum al-wafida). which indivi-
dualize people and severe what is communal (bi al- djSm'-
iyya), while dissolving the internal cohesion of institu-
tions. The concomitant feelings of solidarity have been
replaced by Western abstract ideas which have no relation
with the Egyptian reality.10'
Although this process had of course already been set
in motion during the nineteenth century and had developed
further during the monarchy, al-Bishri believes the July
Revolution witnessed its most destructive phase. The main
reason for this was that the functions and power of the
107 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
108 Ibid., p. 47.
"* TSriq al-Bishrî, al-Maa'ala al-qanuniyya bayna al-
ehart'a al-islamiyya wa al-qanOn al-wad'l, pp. 634-635.
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state expanded enormously. During the monarchy, the power of
political parties had been relatively small. In addition to
that, political organizations like the Wafd, or the Moslem
Brotherhood, relied on traditional institutions in society,
like the village, extended family relations, and neighbour-
hood structures for achieving their political purposes.110
After the July revolution had captured the state, the pro-
cess of Westernization was greatly accelerated. All tradi-
tional institutions and parties were wiped out either for
political reasons, or for ideological reasons. Thus the rise
of modern despotism is related to the loss of selfgoverning
traditional bodies and the feeling of allegience (intima').
Instead, a bureaucracy was installed which could not cope
with its tasks, and political organizations established
which had no sha'bl (popular) character. Society was further
undermined by the loss of the relation between law and
morals lakhiag). The penetration of Western law not only
contributed to the désintégration of society, and Its diver-
sion from the liberation struggle, but also individualized
persons who internalized the struggle between al-wafid and
al-mawOth.111 Al-Bishri feels that if the regime had been
more flexible. It could have combined political and economic
Independence with the preconditions for a nahda by retaining
a cultural authenticity ('asala hadariyya) and a feeling of
national allegience (intima').112
Contemporary Politics: Retrieving the Authentic Past
It Is obvious from the above that al-Bishri's interpretation
of Egyptian history has political implications. It forms the
basis of a political program, which al-Bishri expounded more
explicitly during the 1980s in numerous newspaper articles,
interviews, and seminars. Most of his articles were written
110 TSriq al-Biahrî, "al-Dlmuqrfttiyya wa nizam 23
yulyCr, p. 194.
111 Târiq al-BiBhrl, al-Mas'ala al-qanOnlyya bayna al-
sharl'a al-lslSmlyva wa al-ganûn al-wad'I, pp. 636-639.
112 Târiq al-Bishrl, "al-dîmuqrâtlyya wa nizam 23
p. 165.
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for al-Shasb, the party weekly of the Socialist Workers
Party, of which his friend and comrade In arms "Adil Husayn
became editor-in-chief in December 1985. The Socialist
Workers Party, an offshoot of Young Egypt, formed the Al-
liance (al-Tahaluf) with the Moslem Brotherhood during the
parliamentary elections of April 1987. But in accordance
with his broad political program al-Bishri has tried and
succeeded in keeping his lines open with all the other
political currents, except the left wing Tadjammu' Party.
As in his historical analysis the basic elements of
al-Bishri's political program consist of unity, independ-
ence, and democracy. This trinity forms the prerequisite for
the struggle against imperialism and the flowering of the
nahda. However, with the change of historical perspective
the content of these three themes of the democratic nation-
alist movement have also shifted. Unity now means to close
the gap between the two halves of the parallel society,113
the religious and the secular, which al-Bishri has decribed
as if they "both are on a separate star",11* estranged from
each other "as sects" (ahlbh ta'ifl).11' Moreover, unity
must be based on the shart'a, for al-Bishri believes that
Egypt's turath is basically Islamic.11'
One of the ways in which al-Bishri tackles the enorm-
ous task he has set himself, to overcome all the ideologi-
cal, political, and religious contradictions between the
different currents, is by stressing their historical relat-
113 Muhammad Muruw, Tariq al-Bishrl Shâhid 'alft suqut
al-'ilmaniyya [Tariq al-Bishri Witness to the Pall of
Secularism], p. 4 and p. 7; Târiq al-Bishri, al-Ta'rtkh al-
'arabl...ma zâla yastakhdiam 11 al-di'âya al-giyâsiyya [Arab
History...Continues To Be Used For Political Propaganda],
al-Ahram 17/9/1987.
114 Tariq al-Sishrî, Thulath mulShazat 'an al-haraka
al-dlmuqratiyya, p. 254.
115 Târiq al-Bishrl, al-'Ilmaniyya qasamat al-'al8m al-
islamt [Secularism Has Destroyed the Islamic World], al-
Ahrära 1/10/1984.
116 TSriq al-Bishrî, Bayna al-'urOba wa al-isiam: al-
mawqif roin "ghayr al-muslimtn" wa min al-'ilmaniyya [Between
Arabism and Islam: The Position of "Non-Moslems" and of
Secularism], al-Sha'b 27/5/1986.
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ivity (al-nisbiyya al-ta'rlKhlyya). Only Is this manner can
the rigid barriers they have erected between themselves be
broken down.117 The Marxist tendency to equate political
Islam with reaction is, al-Blshri believes, a strong impedi-
ment to analyzing the contribution the Moslem Brotherhood
made to the liberation struggle.111 Both the nationalist and
the Islamic movements had the same goals: unity (tawhîd) and
liberation (tahrlr).11' Only the historical circumstances in
which they arose caused the two movements to perceive their
differences as Insurmountable. In fact nationalism was
recognized in Egypt, in contrast to Pakistan, as a step,
like Arabism, to a greater allegiance (al-lntlma' al-ashmalj
of the Islamic community.120
Paradoxically historical relativism serves as a means
to achieve a consensus on political unity. Basic to al-
Blshri1 s theory of history is his idea that every political
current has only partaken In but never has monopolized the
course of history as it is embodied In the masses. This
applies as much to the phase when al-Bishrl concentrated his
attention on the democratic nationalist movement, as when he
later on directed his attention to the cultural struggle
between al-wafid and al-mawrOth. Neither the Nationalist
Party, the Wafd, the Communist movement, the Nasserist
regime in the first phase, nor the Moslem Brotherhood during
the second phase adequately reacted to the demands made upon
them by the masses. Therefore al-Blshri severely crltlzes
117 Although al-Blshri uses the expression "historical
relativity" in the article he wrote for al-Ahram. he has
elaborated on It in "The Introduction": Târiq al-Bishrî, al-
•llmaniyya qasamat al-'alam al-islâml, al-Ahram 1/10/1984;
Târiq al-Bishrl, "The Introduction", pp. 1-10.
lla Tarlq al-Blshrl, Thulath mulahazat 'an al-haraka
al-dtmuqratlyya ft rolsr, pp. 255-256.
119 Târiq al-Blshrl, Bayna al-'urflba wa al-lslâm: al-
mawglf min "ghayr al-muallmln" wa mln al-'ilmaniyya, al-
Sha'b 27/5/1986.
120 Tariq al-Bishrl, al-Haraka al-lslamlyya wa
mawqlfuha min al-haraka al-'arablyya [The Islamic Movement
and Its Opinion of the Arab (Nationalist) Movement], al-
Sha'b 20/5/1986.
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the tendency of contemporary political currents to appro-
priate Egyptian history for themselves, to the exclusion of
all others. Al-Bishri seems to suggest that Egyptian history
is the legacy of every Egyptian, whether he likes it or
not.121 Reconciliation, the prerequiste for unity, should be
based on concentrating on the assets of the other in histo-
ry.122 Implied in this scenerio is that once this has taken
place mass-based political currents will amalgate under the
banner of economic reforms, democratic structures and cul-
tural independence.
The central assumption in this political program, on
which everything else hinges, is of course the acceptance by
secular currents as well as non-Moslem minorities of the
shart'a as the pillar on which society should rest. Al-
Bishri tries to make this step as easy as possible. In
itself the vagueness of the term al-tur3th, which also
includes the Coptic church and the secularist Wafd, is a
means to build a consensus around. Another means of includ-
ing other historical currents is by giving the sharl'a the
most liberal interpretion by practising idjtihjtd. Al-Bishri
distinguishes between on the one hand the God given and
unalterable shart'a as the sources of law, and on the other
hand fJLqh as the science of devising principles from the
holy sources, and idjtihâd, the interpretation and applica-
tion of these principles to changing historical circumstan-
ces.1 Z3 _I_djtihad in combination with the framework of al--^
wSfid and al-mawruth leaves enough room for adopting Western
ideas, as long as they are in harmony with the turath and
not in contradiction with the national and Islamic identit-
ity (al-huwiyya) and the feelings of allegience (al-inti-
J 2 ï TSriq al-Bishrî, Hal yumkinu iqtisam al-ta'rîkh
bayna al-waratha7 [ Is It Possible to Divide the History
Between the Inheritors?] Sawt al-'Arab 11/10/1987.
122
muhawila
TSri.q al-Bishrî, Bayna__ al -_* urûba wa al-islSm : f l
11 ra'aba al-sad"; al-Sultan *Abd al-Harald...wa
al-Nasir [Between Arabism and Islam: An Attempt to Mend
the Breach; Sultan Abd al-Hamid...and Abd al-Nasir] al-Sha'b
3/6/1986; Târiq al-Bishrî, "The Introduction", p. 23,
123 T§riq al-Bishrî, al-Has'ala al-qanOnlyya bayna al-
sharl'a al-isiamiyya wa al-gSnOn al-wad'l, p. 642.
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maT).*2 4 Thus a progressive and liberal Islam can guarantee
equality between Moslems and non-Moslems on the .basis of the
principle "for them the same benefits as for us, and for
them the same duties as for us" (lahum m3 lanS wa 'alayhlm
ma 'alayna), disregarding the discriminating taxes and
measures against non-Moslems as historically superseded.129
Also al-Bishrl does not believe that Islam provides for a
state. Islam Is, according to him, rather a cultural value
system held in place by the snarl'a.
Finally, al-Bishri has reached the conclusion that
within this new framework democracy, which has formed such
an Important aspect of his analysis of Egyptian society,
does not necessarily have to be based on the Western idea of
sovereignty of the people. Instead it can be based on a
functional division of power between the legislative, the
executive, and the Judiciary as a system of checks and
balances.126 After the Nasserist state has become incapable
of providing the necessary political, economic, and cultural
independence basic for a feeling of allegiance (Intima') and
identity (huwiyya), the only hope for salvation of Egypt
lies in extending the democratic rights of the people.127
However, in the 1980s the regime has in fact divided the
nation even further by playing the secular currents off
against the Islamic currents. The latest example of this
policy was the campaign the government organized against the
134 TSriq al-Bishrî, Nahnu...bayna al-wafid wa al-
mawruth, p. 361.
121 Târiq al-Bishrl, Bayna al-djâm'a al-dlniyya wa al-
djam'a al-wataniyya fï al-fikr al-slyasl, pp. 57-65; Târiq
al-Bishrî, al-HuslimOn wa al-'aqbat fl 'itêr al-wahda al-
wataniyya [Moslems and Copts within the Framework of the
National Unity], al-Musawwar, 16/3/1984, pp. 20-21.
, 126 Târiq al-Bishrl, Bayna al-'urOba wa al-isläm: al-
mawqif min "ghayra al-muslimln" wa min al-'llmaniyva, al-
Sha'b 27/5/1986; Târiq al-Bishrî, "al-Dlmuqrâtiyya va nizâm
23 yûlyO", p. 114.
127 Proceedings of a seminar in which Tariq al'Blshri
participated called al-Oawla wa tahawwulâtuhâ wa mustaq-
baluhâ fl misr [The State and its Transformations and its
Future in Egypt], in: al-Siyasa al-duwaliyya, Oct. 1987,




Having tried to define and overcome the basic contradictions
in Egyptian society during the past two centuries, it seems
as if al-Bishri has in the end succumbed to them and has
become their embodiment. During the past two decades al-
Bishri ' s works have increasingly become a highly intricate
acrobatic Juggling act of trying to keep as many political
currents as possible in the air at one time. In the first
phase he echoed the contradictions within the Egyptian Left,
who tried to retain the democratic rights of the 1923 Con-
stitution with the socio-economic "achievements" of the
Nasserist regime. In the second phase he tried to solve the
other major contradiction in Egyptian society, the one
between secularism and Islam, which had split Egypt into a
dual society. All these contradictions were subsumed under
the holy trinity of Egyptian nationalism - unity, democracy
and independence - which acquired an Islamic hue as time
went on.
But as al-Bishri included more elements the act
became more precarious. Nowhere does al-Bishri really make
clear how all these currents and their ideologies can be
integrated into a coherent whole. Al-Bishri's basic dilemma
remains unresolved. On the one hand he rejects Western
categories and concepts for interpreting Egyptian history
and analyzing its socio-economic and political transforma-
tion. On the other hand he cannot do without these cate-
gories and concepts as tools for analyzing the past and
devising a program for the future. The search for authen-
ticity reflects the ambigious character of al-Bishri's
quest. Although al-Bishri is certainly correct in rej ecting
the rigid application of Western concepts to Egyptian
history, the ambigious application of the concepts al-wfifid
and al-mawrCth does not seem to present an alternative. If
there ever was an authentic past, its destruction has pro-
128 Târiq al-Bishrî, 'AsSllb al-sira' hawl tawzîf al-
' amwal [Means of Strife in the Case of the Investment of
Money], in: al-Ahram al-'Iqtisâdî 18/7/1988, pp. 20-25.
41
ceeded to such an extent that retrieving it seems a hopeless
task. It also has a conservative slant. Almas t all the
socio-economic and political historical elements al-Bishri
describes as authentic are hierarchical, This conservative
bias is underscored by his rejection of a class analysis.
The only authentic heritage is the sharl'a. But one wonders
what remains of its authentic character once al-Bishri
starts applying western concepts to reinterprete it.
Nevertheless, al-Bishri remains Interesting as one of the
few Egyptian scholars who are aware of the complexity of
the problems Egypt is suffering from.
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